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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(e), U.C.A.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the City has
the power and authority to reduce the penalty portion of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., from a Class
C misdemeanor to an Infraction.
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Standard of Review: This issue is a question of law and is therefore reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994) (issue of waiver of
constitutional rights is reviewed for correctness); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 781
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved at the end of oral argument on the
Defendant's/Appellant's Motion for Jury Trial (R. 74.), and the Defendant/Appellant
timely filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 55.)

2. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the City to
amend its initial Information where the trial court failed to follow and hold the City to the
provisions of Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., and where such amendment prejudiced Caree's
right to a trial by jury.
Standard of Review: This is an abuse of discretion issue and is reviewed for
reasonableness. See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied,
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised after oral argument on the
Defendant's/Appellant's Motion for Jury Trial, (R. 5-6.) and the Defendant/Appellant
timely filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.)
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3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in imposing a fine which substantially
exceeds the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule when no aggravating circumstances were present
and the trial court made no findings which would reasonably justify such enhancement of
the basic fine set forth by the Schedule.
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Russell 791 P. 2d 188,192
(Utah 1990).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised when the Defendant/Appellant timely
filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.)

4. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in (1) denying a hearing on
Caree's Motion for Jury Trial on a date prior to the trial, and (2) denying her a
continuance after denying her Motion where such denial substantially prejudiced her.
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Russell 791 P. 2d 188,192
(Utah 1990).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised when the Defendant/Appellant timely
filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.)
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5. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a penalty on
Caree that substantially exceeds the Uniform Fine/Bail schedule without finding any
aggravating factors because such abuse has a chilling effect on Caree's right to trial and
obviously prejudiced her.
Standard of Review: This issue is a matter of discretion and is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard, except where the court's ruling is based upon a conclusion
of law, and then it is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Russell, 791 P. 2d 188, 192
(Utah 1990).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised when the Defendant/Appellant timely
filed on July 16, 1996, her Notice of Appeal. (R. 74.)

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE

I, SECTION 10 (in part):

In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. . . A jury
in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded, (emphasis added).
I, SECTION 12 (in part):
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, . . . [and] to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury . . . (emphasis added).

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE

UTAH CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VII:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
-8-

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,

§ 41-6-12 (pertinent part):

(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor,
unless otherwise provided.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,

§ 41-6-16 (pertinent part):

The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority
may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions
of this chapter. . .
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,

§ 41-6-46 (pertinent part):

(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions,. . .
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,

§ 76-3-102:

Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §76-3-105.

(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated
and any offense define outside this code which is not designated as a felony or
misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,

§ 77-1-6 (pertinent part):

(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where
the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(2) In addition:
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of
guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.
-9-

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 78-21-1:

In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damages for
breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury,
unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered.
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE

4(d) (pertinent part):

(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by
indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the
offense has been committed.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. . . .
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE

17 (pertinent part):

(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. . . .
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a
jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant
makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders
otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE

38 (pertinent part):

(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the
constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee. . .
(d) . . . A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be
withdrawn without the consent of the parties.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. The Plaintiff/Appellee, West Valley City ("City"), a political subdivision of the
State of Utah, initiated this action pursuant to § 41-6-46, U.C.A., against the
Defendant/Appellant Caree F. McDonald ("Caree") by issuing a summons and citation to
her for allegedly speeding on January 6, 1996, in West Valley City, Utah. (R. 1.) Caree
was specifically charged with driving at a speed of 51 miles per hour in a 40 mile per
hour speed zone, or 11 MPH over the posted speed limit. (R. 1,5.)
2. Pursuant to § 41-6-12, U.C.A., the penalty for violating § 41-6-46, U.C.A., is a
Class C Misdemeanor. See Addendum 7; (R. 5.)
3. The Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule provides for a $50.00 fine when the offender is
guilty of speeding 11-15 miles per hour in excess of the speed limit. See Addendum 4.
4. The City relied on Photo Radar as the sole means of determining the speed of
Caree's vehicle. (R. 6.)
5. Caree resides in West Valley City, Utah, and has no record of any other traffic
violations within the past five years. (R. 5.)
6. After a pre-trial conference, a trial was set for June 20, 1996. (R. 24.)
7. On May 22, 1996, Caree made her demand for a jury trial. (R. 25.)
8. On June 7, 1996, the City's Prosecutor filed an amended Information in which
the penalty was reduced from a Class C Misdemeanor to an Infraction. (R. 32.)
9. On June 13, 1996, the trial court informed Caree that she would not be entitled to
a jury trial since the City, through its Prosecutor, had amended the Information and had
-11-

reduced the penalty from a Class C Misdemeanor to an Infraction. (R. 34.)
10. On the same day, June 13, 1996, Caree filed a Motion for Jury Trial and
requested "Expedited Disposition" and that the trial court set a hearing prior to the day of
trial. (R. 36-42.) Notwithstanding Caree's request, the trial court refused to set a hearing
on her Motion for Jury Trial.
11. On June 20, 1996, the date set for trial, the trial court denied Caree's Motion for
Jury Trial. (R. 74.)1 The trial court also denied Caree's Motion for Continuance, which
was orally made to the trial court immediately upon the trial court's denial of a jury trial.
(R. 34.)
12. The trial court forced Caree to proceed with a bench trial. (R. 75.) Caree, upon
observing the hostile and brusque demeanor of the trial judge, desired to consider the
Prosecutor's plea offer. (R. 74.) However, the Prosecutor unexpectedly informed Caree
and the trial court that the plea offer had expired the day prior to trial and prior to the
hearing on Caree's request for a jury trial. (R. 74.) Thus, the plea offer was withdrawn.
(R. 74.)
13. The trial court proceeded with a bench trial and found Caree guilty of speeding
as charged. (R. 76.)

1

The trial court characterized its own action as merely approving the City's action in amending the
Information to an Infraction. (R. 75.) However, the trial court's statement that "My ruling isn't denying your
client a jury trial," strains the court's credibility. (R. 75.)
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14. The trial court then imposed, without finding any aggravating circumstances, a
fine amount of $60.00, an amount that exceeds by 20% the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule
and which exceeds the amount that Caree could have paid prior to the trial without
considering any plea offer. (R. 44, 77.); Addendum 4. In addition, the trial court
imposed a time and cost requirement for Caree to attend a Safety Driver's School at an
additional cost of $30.00. (R. 44-45, 47, 77.) The trial court failed to find any
aggravating circumstances. (R. 76-75.) In fact, Caree stated to the trial court that she had
no other traffic violations within the past five years. (R. 76.)
15. On July 15, 1996, Caree filed her Notice of Appeal, her Motion for Stay of
Fine, and her Application for Certificate of Probable Cause. (R. 48-58.) On
August 6, 1996, at the conclusion of oral argument before the Honorable
Judith S.H. Atherton, the trial court granted Caree's Motion for Stay of Fine.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the City has the power and
authority to reduce the penalty portion of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., from a Class C misdemeanor
to an Infraction. Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-16, U.C.A., expressly prohibits the City
from enacting or enforcing an ordinance or rule that is inconsistent with the provisions of
Chapter 6, Title 41. Hence, the City, nor its agent (i.e., the City's Prosecutor), had no
authority to change the penalty for speeding from a Class C Misdemeanor to an
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Infraction.
II. The trial court also impermissibly permitted the City to amend its Information
without regard to Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., and without considering that such
amendment denied Caree her substantial right to a trial by jury.
III. Even if, arguendo, the City could reduce the penalty for speeding from a Class
C misdemeanor to an Infraction, the trial court erred in denying Caree a trial by jury
because Utah's Constitution guarantees to Caree her right to a trial by jury. Whereas
Utah's Constitution places no limits on Caree's right to trial by jury, Utah Code
Annotated § 77-l-6(2)(e) impermissibly limits Caree's right to a trial by jury where the
penalty is an Infraction. However, the Constitution does not carve out a classification for
an "infraction" that is separate from "criminal" or "civil." Since the Constitution clearly
grants all "criminal" and all "civil" actions the right to trial by jury, Utah Code Annotated
§ 77-l-6(2)(e) is without constitutional support.
IV. The trial abused its discretion in not setting a hearing on Caree's Motion for
Jury Trial on a date prior to the date of trial and in not granting a continuance after
denying Caree's Motion for Jury Trial because the burden on the trial court was slight, if
any, and substantially prejudiced Caree.
V. The trial court, without finding any aggravating circumstances, abused its
discretion by imposing a fine that is substantially greater than would have been imposed
if Caree had simply plead guilty. The trial court's actions cast a disturbing chill over a
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defendant's right to trial In this instance, the trial court, in effect, penalized Caree
simply because she elected to have a trial.

ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the City has the power
and authority to reduce the penalty portion of $ 41-6-12, U.C.A.% from a Class C
misdemeanor to an Infraction,
Caree was charged by the City with speeding pursuant to the State's speeding

statute, § 41-6-46, U.C.A. (R. 1.) The penalty for such violation is governed by
§41-6-12, U.C.A., which states in part:
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C
misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided.
§41-6-12, U. CA.
The City acknowledged that the penalty for speeding is a Class C misdemeanor
when it filed its Information on April 15, 1996. Addendum 7; (R. 5.) The Information
states in part:
Count 1: SPEEDING, a Class "C" misdemeanor, § 41-6-46, U.C.A.
1953, as amended, by operating a motor vehicle...
Addendum 7; (R. 5.)
The City's Information unequivocally declared the penalty for Caree's alleged
violation to be a Class "C" misdemeanor. The Information also expressly referenced
§ 41-6-46, U.C.A., for its authority.
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Pursuant to Rule 17(d), Utah R. Cr. P., Caree filed her jury demand, on
May 23, 1996. The City, without the trial court's permission, filed its Amended
Information on June 7, 1997.2 See Addendum 2; (R. 25, 32.) The Amended Information
is identical to the City's initial Information except that "a Class C misdemeanor" is
replaced with "an Infraction." See Addendum 2; (R. 32.) The Amended Information also
references § 41-6-46, U.C.A., for its authority.
The City entirely ignored § 41-6-16, U.C.A., even though this particular Code
section was expressly brought to the City's attention in Caree's Motion for Jury Trial.
See (R. 36-40.) This Code section governs the provisions of Chapter 6, Title 41:
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout
this state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A
local authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict
with the provisions of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt
ordinances consistent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances
which are not in conflict with this chapter.
§ 41-6-16, U.C.A. (emphasis added).
Section 41-6-16 is clear and unambiguous. The City is not permitted to "enact or
enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., which
defines the penalty for a violation of § 41-6-46, U.C.A., as a "Class C misdemeanor."
SeeAllgoodv. Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1976); Richfield City v. Walker,
790 P.2d 87, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("penalty portion of an ordinance is void if it

2

The City never petitioned the trial court nor filed a motion for permission to amend its Information,
although Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., expressly governs the procedure for amending an information.
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conflicts with the general state law governing the subject").
Jn Allgood, the court concluded that cities may not exceed the "public policy
declared by the legislature." See Allgood, 545 P.2d 530 at 532. The Allgood court also
concluded that the treatise, McQuillin, correctly states Utah law:
If the ordinance penalty conflicts with that of the general law of the
State covering the same subject, the ordinance penalty is void.
5 McQuillin, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §17.15 at 326 (3d Ed.)
In the instant case, the City's actions, changing the penalty from that set by
§41-6-12, directly conflicts with State law. Moreover, even without the provisions of
§ 41-6-16, which expressly forbids the City from actions which are inconsistent with the
provisions of Chapter 6 of Title 41, the City is prohibited from setting a different penalty
for speeding, since the State has expressly enacted laws covering the subject of speeding
and setting forth the penalties for speeding violations. See 5 McQuillin, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS

II.

§17.15 at 326 (3d Ed.)

The trial court abused its discretion in permitting the City to amend its initial
Information because the trial court failed to follow and hold the City to the
provisions of Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P.< and because such amendment prejudiced
Careers right to a trial by jury.
Rule 4(d), Utah R. Cr. P., governs amendments to an information:
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted
by indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to
believe the offense has been committed....
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(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different
offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not
prejudiced....
Rule 4(d), UtahR. Cr. P.
It is well established that Caree's right to a jury trial is a substantial right. See
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297-98 (Utah 1986) (a "criminal defendant's right to a jury
trial is substantial and valuable and should be carefully safeguarded by our courts"). In
Cook, the court also concluded that:
Had defendant been tried before a jury, the prosecution's failure to
prove the offense charged might have resulted in an acquittal [rather
than merely failing to prove the felony]. Id. at 298.
In the instant case, had Caree been tried before a jury, Caree might have been acquitted.
Therefore, Caree's right to a jury trial is clearly substantial.
Caree timely filed her demand for a jury trial. (R. 25.) Two weeks after filing her
demand, the City amended its Information without petitioning the trial court for
permission, (R. 32.), which effectively denied Caree her statutory right to a trial by jury.
The trial court never discussed Rule 4(d) nor the prejudice to Caree caused by the City's
Amended Information. The trial court's actions were clearly in error where the City's
Amended Information effectively eliminated Caree's statutory right to a trial by jury.
Moreover, the City's purpose in amending its Information was for the sole purpose of
denying Caree a jury trial.
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III. Even if, arguendo, the City could reduce the penalty from a Class C
misdemeanor to an Infraction, the trial court erred in denying Caree a trial by
jury because Utah's Constitution guarantees to Caree a right to a trial by jury*
Utah's Constitution grants to every citizen, including Caree, the right to a trial by
jury. Sections 10 and 12 and Amendment VII provide Caree's right to a trial by jury:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, [and] to have a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury . . . .
UTAH CONST.

§ 12 (emphasis added).

In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. .
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
UTAH CONST.

§ 10 (emphasis added).

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.
UTAH CONST.,

Amendment VII (emphasis added).

Utah Code Annotated also generally reaffirms Caree's right to a trial by jury. If
Caree's alleged violation is deemed to be criminal, § 77-1-6, U.C.A., applies:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, [and] to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury . . . .
§ 77-l-6(l)(f), U.C.A. (emphasis added).
If Caree's alleged violation is deemed to be civil, § 78-21-6, U.C.A., applies:
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In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property,
with or without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract
or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact
may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is
ordered.
§ 78-21-6, U.C.A. (emphasis added).
Utah's Constitution does not limit Careers right to a trial by jury, regardless of
whether the charges against Caree are characterized as criminal or civil. The Constitution
contains no express language nor any intent to carve out a distinct class of court actions
that is separate from "criminal" or "civil." Therefore, an "Infraction" must either be
classified as criminal or civil; there is no middle ground.3 Assume, arguendo, that the
City was within its power and authority to change the penalty portion of its Information
to an Infraction. The action against Caree must be deemed criminal or civil. Regardless
of which classification is applicable, Caree is entitled to a trial by jury as granted by
Utah's Constitution: Sections 10 and 12, Amendment VII.
Whereas § 77-l-6(l)(f), U.C.A., places no limits on Caree's right to a trial "by an
impartial jury," § 77-l-6(2)(e) allows a conviction for an "infraction" without a jury:
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.
§ 77-l-6(l)(f), U.CA.

3

Utah's Code provides a one-sentence designation for offenses: "Offenses are designated as
felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions." § 76-3-102, U.CA. From this Code section, it can be logically
inferred that infractions are classified as "criminal" violations.
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Rule 17(d), Utah R. Cr. P., goes further:
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the
defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or
the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an
infraction.
Rule 17(d), UtahR. Cr. P.
Yet, the Code does not expressly define an infraction as criminal or civil, except by
inference.4 Thus, subsection (2)(e) of § 77-1-6 places a limitation on the right granted in
subsection (l)(f) merely by creating a new classification, "Infraction," without any
constitutional basis. Rule 17(d) is even more explicit. Section 77-l-6(2)(e), U.C.A., and
Rule 17(d), Utah R. Cr. P., therefore, impermissibly limit Caree's right to a trial by jury
where the Constitution places no such limitations. The Constitution must trump the Code
and the Rule.
IV. The trial court abused its discretion in (1) denying a hearing on Careers Motion
for Jury Trial on a date prior to the trial, or (2) denying her a continuance after
denying her Motion because such denial substantially prejudiced her.
On the same day that Caree was informed by the trial court that she was no longer
entitled to a jury trial,5 Caree filed her Motion for Jury Trial. (R. 36-42.) She also
requested the trial court to set a hearing prior to the day of trial. Id. However, the trial
court refused to set a hearing prior to the date of trial.

4

See Footnote 3, supra.

5

On May 22, 1996, Caree filed her demand for a jury trial pursuant to Rule 17(d). On June 7, 1996,
the City filed its Amended Information and changed the penalty to an infraction, thereby eliminating Caree's
right to a jury trial.
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Since the trial court must have a pool of jurors ready for jury trials, the trial court
had, in effect, made its decision to deny Caree's Motion for Jury Trial prior to hearing.
Otherwise, the trial court would have provided for sufficient time between the date of
hearing and the date of trial in the event the trial court granted Caree's motion.
It is true that had the trial court granted Caree's Motion for Jury Trial, the trial court
could have then granted itself a continuance to assemble a jury. By the same token, the
trial court, with slight burden, could also have granted Caree a continuance when it
denied her Motion for Jury Trial. Whatever inconvenience the trial court or the City
might experience from a continuance to assemble a jury is the same inconvenience, if
any, created by granting Caree a continuance. Yet, the trial court was, if it had not prejudged Caree's motion, quite willing to be put in a position where it would have to grant
a continuance for itself upon granting Caree's motion.
The trial court's abuse of discretion prejudiced Caree in two ways: (1) Caree's
opportunity to negotiate for or accept a plea was foreclosed; and (2) Caree's trial
preparation was geared to presenting her case to a jury and where the trial court failed to
allow time for Caree to adjust her trial strategy.
V.

The trial court abused its discretion in imposing a penalty on Caree that
substantially exceeds the Uniform Fine/Bail schedule without finding any
aggravating factors because such abuse has a chilling effect on Caree's right to
trial and obviously prejudiced her.
The trial court abused is discretion by imposing a total fine of $60.00 plus $30.00

and attendance at a safety driving school. (R. 44-45, 47, 77.) Appendix C, CJA, sets
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forth the uniform Fine/Bail schedule, incorporated herein as Addendum 4. For speeding
11-20 miles per hour over the speed limit, the Schedule sets a fine of $50.00. See
Addendum 4.
An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the trial court were
inherently unfair or if the trial court imposed an excessive fine. See State v. Russell, 791
P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) (citing State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986);
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978).
By imposing a greater fine than a defendant would ordinarily pay if he or she pleads
nolo contendere or guilty, the trial court has cast a chilling net over those who may want
to go to trial. Since Caree has a fundamental right to a jury trial, any effort by the trial
court to undermine or curtail that right through intimidation or threat of an enhanced
penalty is an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
The City's Amended Information is in direct conflict with State Law where State
Law expressly prohibits the City from setting a penalty different than that proscribed by
State Law for a speeding violation. Further, since the City's Amended Information
prejudiced a substantial right of Caree, namely her right to a trial by jury, the trial court
abused its discretion in permitting the City to amend its information.
But even if the City could change the penalty portion of § 41-6-12, U.C.A., to an
infraction, Utah's Constitution guarantees Caree a trial by jury, notwithstanding Utah's
Code section that limits jury trials to felonies, misdemeanors, and all civil cases. Utah's
-23-

Constitution does not contemplate a category of court actions different than "criminal" or
"civil." An infraction is an enigma that is created solely by Utah's Code and with no
support from Utah's Constitution.
The trial court also abused its discretion by refusing to set a hearing on Caree's
Motion for Jury Trial on a date prior to the date of trial. The burden for the trial court to
hold a hearing on Caree's motion was slight, if any. The prejudice to Caree by not
holding a hearing on a date prior to trial denied Caree a right to accept the City
Prosecutor's plea, which was withdrawn the day prior to the date of trial. Once the trial
court denied Caree's motion, it again abused its discretion by not granting a requested
continuance. Such continuance would have been required if the trial court had granted
Caree's motion because the trial court would need to assemble a jury pool. Moreover,
Caree was prejudiced by the trial court's denial because she was not permitted to accept
the City's plea and was not provided time to adjust her trial strategy.
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgments of the trial court, order a new
trial with a jury, if Caree so desires, and order the trial court to disallow the City's
attempt to amend its Information. In addition, and partly in the alternative, the Court of
Appeals should, in the interests of justice, dismiss the charges against Caree.
DATED this 23rd day of June 1997.
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Counsel for Caree F.UcfcDonald, Defendant/Appellant
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Keith L. Stoney (3868)
David L. Clark (6199)
West Valley City Prosecutor's
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
(801) 963-3331
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
Plaintiff,

:

v.

:
:
:
:
:

MCDONALD, CAREE F.
4 360 WEST BENVIEW DRIVE
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120
Defendant.
The

undersigned,

I N F O R M A T I O N
Case No. 969002082

:
DAVID

L.

CLARK,

under

oath,

states

on

information and belief that the defendant, on or about 6 JANUARY
1996, at the vicinity of 3300 WEST 4100 SOUTH, West Valley City,
Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of:
COUNT 1:

SPEEDING, a Class "C" Misdemeanor, 41-6-46, U.C.A. 1953,
as amended, by operating a motor vehicle at a speed of dt
least 11 MPH over the posted limit.

This information
following witnesses:

is based

on evidence

obtained

from

SGT MCLACHLAN

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:

the

Tab 2

Keith L. Stoney (3868)
City Prosecutor
West Valley City
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119
(801) 963-3331
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH (WVC)
:
j:

Plaintiff,
V.

J

MCDONALD, CAREE F.
436 0 WEST BENVIEW DRIVE
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120

:
;
:
:

A M E N D E D
I N F O R M A T I O N
Case No. 969002082

Defendant.
The undersigned, DAVID L. CLARK, under oath, states on
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 6 JANUARY
1996, at the vicinity of 3300 WEST 4100 SOUTH, West Valley City,
Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s)
of;
COUNT 1:

SPEEDING, an "Infraction", 41-6-46, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, by operating a motor vehicle at a speed of at
least 11 MPH over the posted limit.

This information
following witnesses:

is based

on evidence

obtained

from

SGT MCLACHLAN

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:

the
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1
1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT

3

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4
5
6
7

WEST VALLEY CITY,

)

8

Plaintiff,

)

9
10
11

v.

)

CAREE MCDONALD,
Defendant.

Case No. 969002082

)
)

12
13
14
15

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARLOS A. ESQUEDA

16
17

June 20, 1996

18
19
20 j
21
22
23
24
25

Pre-Trial Motion Hearing, Verdict, and Sentencing

1

APPEARANCES

2
3
4

For Plaintiff:

John Huber

5

Assistant West Valley City Prosecutor

6

West Valley City

7

3600 Constitution Blvd.

8

West Valley City, Utah 84119

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

For Defendant:

Michael A. Jensen

16

Attorney at Law

17

900 First Interstate Plaza

18

170 South Main

19

Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1655

20
Zl

22
23
24
25

1

June 20, 1996

2

PROCEEDINGS

3
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. JENSEN:

Go ahead Mr. Jensen.
Your Honor, there is a statute that very clearly states that this

6

speeding ordinance shall be uniform and no municipality may enact or enforce any rule, or

7

ordinance in conflict with the provisions. And the provisions are very clear that it's a Class

8

C misdemeanor. Secondly, in a more recent case of Richfield City, in which case, by the

9

way, the city was promoting a Class B misdemeanor and the State was also Class B

10

misdemeanor. But the court held that a penalty portion of an ordinance is void if it conflicts

11

with the general State law governing the subject. Now, it doesn't invalidate the ordinance

12

when the city has an ordinance in which the penalty portion is different from the State, but

13

the penalty portion is clearly void. There are other cases that I can cite as well, that was a

14

Court of Appeals case, 1990. There is also a 1976 Supreme Court case which says basically

15

the same thing: Allgood v. Larson, said the same thing. If the ordinance penalty conflicts

16

with that of the general law of the State covering the same subject, the ordinance penalty is

17

void. I don't believe that the prosecutor can unilaterally just change that, and particularly

18

change its ordinance for the express purpose of avoiding jury trial, Your Honor. Do you

19

have any questions on that?

20
21

THE COURT:

I have no questions of you, Mr. Jensen. Mr. Huber, do you

have any response to Mr. Jensen's argument?

22

MR. HUBER:

Your Honor, (inaudible) specifically (inaudible)

23

THE COURT:

Well, specifically what he just enunciated in court today that

24

you're abusing your discretion, that the city has no authority in which to amend charges

25

down if it conflicts with the sentencing statutes in accordance with the Utah Code

4
1

Annotated of state law.

2

MR. HUBER:

The city's response is that the prosecutors should have at their

3

discretion the ability to amend a charge lower, to notch it down. We don't have the

4

discretion to notch it up. In other words, we couldn't have charged the defendant with a

5

Class B in this case. Our position is that we can amend that down. The city's interest is

6 |

we don't have the desire to give the defendant the possibility, however slim, of facing jail

7

time; and we believe we have the discretion in prosecuting to represent those interests in not

8

trying to seek a penalty that has the possibility of jail time. In summary, Your Honor, our

9

position is that the prosecutors do have the discretion to amend the charge to a lower

10

degree, but not to a higher degree.

11

THE COURT:

Your response to that, Mr. Jensen.

12

MR. JENSEN:

Yes, Your Honor. I think it's all good if the city's intent really

13

was to reduce the penalty by reducing and taking away jail time. But, it's clear from their

14

actions that the city has taken here that they didn't do that until we requested a jury trial.

15

So their sole motivation in this case wasn't the issue of jail time, it was simply to eliminate

16

the jury trial. So, it's a little bit deceptive to talk about jail time because that was never an

17

issue in this case and it hasn't been done except in those cases where a jury trial has been

18

requested, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

It could be an issue if the case is remaining as a Class C

20

misdemeanor because the maximum sentence is 90 days in jail and a $750 fine, would you

21

agree?

22

MR. JENSEN:

I absolutely agree. All I'm talking about is the motivation of the

23

city in doing that. The motivation wasn't the jail time. The motivation was to remove the

24

access to a jury trial. That's all I have.

25

THE COURT:

Thank you. I'm going to deny the defense motion in regards to

5
1

this case. I believe that the city prosecutor, as well as any prosecutor within the state, has

2

the power and the authority in which to amend down any charge when they feel the facts

3

substantiate that. I don't believe the city's motives, I don't question the city's motives. It's

4

within their complete discretion to do so. I previously ruled on that. Mr. Jensen, I'm going

5

to deny your motion as I previously have in your other cases. Where do we rest? Do we

6

need to put this trial on today?

7

MR. JENSEN:

Your Honor, why don't I make a motion to continue this in

8

order so I have time to talk to my client to see if we want to, now that there's not a jury

9

trial available, to see whether or not they want to take the plea bargain instead.

10
11
12

THE COURT:

Talk to your client and see if they're willing to take the plea

bargain. I'm not willing to continue the case.
MR. HUBER:

At this time, I believe that Mr. Jensen has been informed earlier

13

that if his client wished to take our offer, that we have to do that the day before the trial

14

because we have taken great efforts to prepare this trial and we're ready to proceed. We

15

withdraw that plea offer. So, I think choice is to proceed or plead guilty.

16
17
18

MR. JENSEN:

Your Honor, that was never communicated, and besides this

whole issue was predicated on whether there was a jury trial.
THE COURT:

Well, Mr. Jensen, I'm going to disagree with you cause we've

19

gone through this before and I told you last time that if you're going to run these kind of

20

issues, these kind of motions, that we're going to put the trial on. Frankly, I'm willing to

21

give you another chance, but apparently, the prosecution isn't willing to offer those plea

22

bargains today. Is that correct, Mr. Huber?

23

MR. HUBER:

Yes, Your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

So, we're either going - Ms. McDonald either has a choice of

25

entering a plea today, or we'll put the trial, we'll put the bench trial on right now. Do you

6
1

want time to talk it over with Ms. McDonald?

2

MR. JENSEN:

Well, I'm not clear. You're saying that there is no plea bargain.

31

THE COURT:

That's right. The offer is plead guilty today or we'll put the trial

5

MR. JENSEN:

That's sort of no choice, is it?

6

THE COURT:

No, that is a choice. Do you not understand the question, Mr.

4

7

on.

Jensen? Does your client want to present evidence today and have the trial—

8

MR. JENSEN:

Yes.

9

THE COURT:

Or is she willing or does she want to enter a guilty plea

10

considering the city prosecutor has just rescinded their offers?

11
12

MR. JENSEN:

Order then denying a jury trial for appeal purposes.

13
14

We do, Your Honor. We would like to preserve the Court's

THE COURT:

I didn't deny your jury trial. I found that there was no basis in

your motion, which states that the prosecution has no authority to amend down the charge.

15

MR. JENSEN:

We would just like to preserve that for appeal, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

Under my words, yes. Under your's, no. That's not an accurate

17

statement of my ruling. My ruling isn't denying your client a jury trial. My ruling is, in my

18

opinion, under the laws of this State, that the city has the authority to amend down their

19

information, which they properly did.

20

MR. JENSEN:

That's fine, but, I mean, I just want to preserve that.

21

THE COURT:

That's on the record, Mr. Jensen. Now back to my original

22

question. Are you prepared to proceed to trial or is your client going to enter a guilty plea

23

today?

24

MR. JENSEN:

We're ready, we're ready, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT:

Okay. We'll do one sentencing prior to this and that's

1

[The proceedings were temporarily diverted to another case]

2 I

[The trial followed after the temporary diversion]

3

5
6 I
7 I

[Following the trial, the Court rendered its verdict as follows, followed by
sentencing]

8
9 I

THE COURT:

The most convincing evidence came from Ms. McDonald's own

10

words in that she probably did not look at the 40 m.p.h. sign. If she probably did not look

11

at the 40 m.p.h. sign, she probably did not look at the posted sign that warns her and gives

12

her notice that photo radar is about to be used; and you ought to slow down and make sure

13

your speed is 40 m.p.h. She doesn't believe that she is speeding. She doesn't recall if she

14

was speeding. She doesn't state in her testimony that she specifically looked at her

15

speedometer and noted that she was doing 40 m.p.h. on 4100 South. Based upon that

16

testimony, I find Miss McDonald guilty of speeding, an infraction. Do you wish sentence to

17

be imposed today, Mr. Jensen?

18

MR. JENSEN:

Yes, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

Is there anything you want to tell me before I impose sentence,

20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Jensen?
MR. JENSEN:

Ms. McDonald has a clean record, never had a violation, at least

in the last five years to her memory (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Miss McDonald, is there anything you want to add before I

impose sentence?
MS. MCDONALD:

No.

8
1 I

THE COURT;

Mr. Huber, any recommendations from the city?

2

MR. HUBER:

No, judge.

3

THE COURT:

I think the problem here, as with all speeding tickets, is that

4

when we all get a speeding ticket, and I dare to say that if there is anyone in this court room

5

that hasn't received a speeding ticket, that's amazing and congratulations to you, because

6

I've been a victim of a speeding ticket myself. I don't like it. I don't personally think it's

7

fair, simply because, why should I get caught when everyone else is doing it? Why doesn't

8

everybody get caught? Well, in a perfect world, we wouldn't need speed limits. We would

9

all drive carefully. We wouldn't need laws. Well, Miss McDonald, on this occasion you

10

got caught. It doesn't mean you're a terrible driver. It doesn't mean you're a terrible

11

person. It just means that on a particular day, January 6, 1996, you were speeding. It's as

12

simple as that. Based upon that, I'm going to impose a $60.00 fine. I ask that you go to

13

traffic school and to provide proof of that within the next 45 days. How long do you need

14

to pay the $60.00 fine?

15

MS. MCDONALD:

16

THE COURT:

17 J

20
21
22
23
24
25

Okay, one month to pay the $60.00 fine. Please see the court

Ms. McDonald before you leave.

18
19 |

30 days.

(end of proceedings)
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ADDENDUM 4
SPEEDING VIOLATIONS
41-6-46
Speeding
MPH Over Speed
Limit
0-10 MPH
11-15 MPH
16-20 MPH
21-25 MPH
26-30 MPH
31-35 MPH
36-40 MPH
For speeding
offenses in
school zone add:
41+MPH
matrix Court

40.00
50.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00

40.00
50.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00

20.00
300.00

20.00
see Mandatory

41 -6-46

Speed too fast
for existing
conditions (no
accident)

50.00

41-6-49

Driving too slow

50.00

Appearance
50.00

50.00

Tab 5

ADDENDUM 5
UTAH CONSTITUTION:

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the
jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial'by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
AMENDMENT

VII

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED;

41-6-12. Violations of chapter - Penalties.
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless
otherwise provided.
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11, 15, and 17 of this chapter is an
infraction, unless otherwise provided.

41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter - Effect of local ordinances.
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this state and
in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enact or
enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter. Local
authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent with this chapter, and additional
traffic ordinances which are not in conflict with this chapter.

41-6-46. Speed regulations
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential hazards
then existing, including when:
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing;
(b) approaching and going around a curve;
(c) approaching a hill crest;
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and
(e) special hazards exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, weather, or highway
conditions.
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Subsection (4) and Sections 41-6-47
and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful:
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section
41-6-20.1;
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations.
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed in excess of the limits
provided in this section or established under Section 41-6-47 or 41-6-48, is prima facie
evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.
(4) The governor by proclamation in time of war or emergency may change the
speed limits on the highways of the state.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:

76-3-102. Designation of offenses.
Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions.

76-3-105. Infractions.
(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated
and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a felony
or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled
to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the
business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws
of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of
guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has
been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.
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78-21-1. Right to jury trial.
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or without
damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damages for breach of
contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is
waived or a reference is ordered.
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:

Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses.
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been
committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or
by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where
appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need
not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities,
written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice
need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or
information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of
the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare
his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the
court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to
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such conditions as justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in
the statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the
indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was
based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the
validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant.
Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause,
furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so
endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear
before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the following
exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent
in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendants
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment
entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been
present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal attendance of the
defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order:
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
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(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in open
court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be
allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in Section
78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused and
the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in open court, proceed
to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise
required.
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the
following order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense
may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has
rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court,
for good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the
court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense
shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense
argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of
counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror
has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors remaining.
Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial ordered.
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other material fact
occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to
the place, which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the court for that
purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer
no person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any
subject connected with the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay
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or at a specified time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse
among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any other
person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an
opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of the
court and all exhibits and papers which have been received as evidence, except
depositions; and each juror may also take with him any notes of the testimony or other
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in some
convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict or are
discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, the
officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication to be made to
them, or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any
point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them, who
shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be
brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the
court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be
given. Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the
inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by
the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or indictment, or
any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish
the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:

Rule 38. Jury trial of right.
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution or as
given by statute shall be preserved to the parties.
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a
jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor
in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days
after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed
upon a pleading of the party.
(c) Same: Specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the issues
which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial by jury
for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by jury for only some of the issues,
any other party, within 10 days after service of the demand or such lesser time as the
court may order, may serve a demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of
fact in the action.
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand as
required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of
trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn
without the consent of the parties.
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